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ON MEANING
THE MEANING OF MEANING IN THE LAW
MICHAEL L. GEIS*
I. THE MULTIPLE MEANINGS OF MEANING
In his dissent in Gregg v. Georgia,' Justice Brennan asserted that the
Supreme Court is "the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of our Constitu-
tion."2 The question arises, however, as to what the Justice meant by his
claim, for the noun meaning and its verbal counterpart mean are multiply
ambiguous. Four of their meanings are illustrated by the examples of (1),'
each of which is drawn from the Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia.4
Justice Brennan authored the first, while Justice Marshall's opinion gives
us the second, third and fourth examples.
(1) a. If the word unusual is to have any meaning apart from the word
cntel, however, the meaning should be the ordinary one, signifying
something different from that which is generally done.'
b. The fact that the State may seek retribution against those who have
broken its laws does not mean that retribution may then become the
State's sole end in punishing.6
c. There is some recognition of the fact that a prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishments is a flexible prohibition that may
change in meaning as the mores of a society change, and that may
eventually bar certain punishments not barred when the Constitution
was adopted.'
d. Justices White and Holmes dissented and argued that the cruel and
* Emeritus Professor of Linguistics, Department of Linguistics, The Ohio State University.
1. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
2. Id. at 229.
3. For a more complete list of examples illustrating the various senses of meaning, see 1 JOHN
LN\oNs, SEMANTICS (1977).
4. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
5. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-101 n.32 (1958), cited in 408 U.S. at 276 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). Italics is used for quotations when linguistic forms are being cited so that they will be
consistent with the text.
6. 408 U.S. at 343 (Marshall, J., concurring).
7. Id. at 321 n.19 (citing I Annals of Cong. 782-83 (1789)).
1125
Washington University Open Scholarship
1126 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
unusual prohibition was meant to prohibit only those things that
were objectionable at the time the Constitution was adopted.8
In (la), Justice Brennan seems to have in mind a sense of the term meaning
according to which the meaning in question is conventional (i.e., is widely
accepted and attached to the linguistic form in question). In (lb) mean
would seem to be equivalent in conventional meaning to the word entail.
In (1c), we have a use of mean largely equivalent to significance or
import.9 Finally, in (ld), we have a use of mean that is equivalent to
intend.
That the justices might have employed the words mean and meaning in
these four quite distinct ways should not be surprising, for each plays a
critical role in language understanding. Suppose, for instance, that A and
B are dining together and A says, Can you reach the salt?, to B, an
utterance that has the conventional meaning of an inquiry of B by A as to
whether or not B is physically able to reach the salt. In this case, B would
likely assume that A's saying this meant that she wanted the salt (the
contextual significance of the utterance), that is, that A's goal was to obtain
the salt (the speaker's intention). However, suppose that A is arranging the
apartment of B, who is physically handicapped, so that B can be self-
sufficient and A says, Can you reach the salt? to B. In this case, B would
likely assume that A's saying this meant that A wanted to know whether
or not B was physically able to reach the salt (the contextual significance
of the utterance), that is, that A's goal was to come to know whether or not
B was physically able to reach the salt (the speaker's intention).
The importance of beliefs about people's goals to understanding the
contextual significance of their utterances is made particularly clear by
another example.
(2) a. I'll give you $5 if you mow the lawn.
8. 408 U.S. at 325 (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 389-413 (1910)).
9. The Justices use two other locutions within the meaning of X and give meaning to X, where
"X" is a word, phrase, or sentence.
(i) "[The petitioners] are here on petitions for certiorari which we granted limited to the
question whether the imposition and execution of the death penalty constitute "cruel and
unusual punishment" within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment as applied to the
States by the Fourteenth."
408 U.S. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring).
(ii) "Thus, the history of the clause clearly establishes that it was intended to prohibit cruel
punishments. We must now turn to the case law to discover the manner in which
courts have given meaning to the term cruel."
Id. at 322 (Marshall, J., concurring). Arguably, these uses of meaning have essentially the same meaning
as does the occurrence of meaning in (lc).
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b. I won't give you $5 if you don't mow the lawn.
Geis and Zwicky't observed that sentences of the form P if Q (2a) are
commonly taken to imply propositions of the form not P if not Q (2b).
However, it is clear that this sometimes quite compelling inference does not
always go through and is therefore clearly not an entailment." A critical
factor is the perceived goal of the person who initiates the interaction. Note
that while (2a) seems to imply (2b) in conversation (3), it does not in
conversation (4).
(3) A, an adult, phones B, a young neighbor of A.
A: Are you mowing lawns this summer?
B: Yes.
A: I'll give you $5 if you mow my lawn.
B: I would like to, but my lawn mower is being repaired.
(4) B, the child of A, approaches A.
B: Say, Mom, I need $5.
A: I'll give you $5 if you mow the lawn.
B: The mower is being repaired.
A: Well, I'll give you $5 if you clean out the garage.
The difference in the two cases concerns whose goal is being negotiated.'2
In the case of Scenario (3), it is A's goal of getting her lawn mowed that
is being negotiated. In this case, we could reasonably say that I'll give you
$5 if you mow my lawn means that (contextual significance) the speaker
will not give the addressee $5 if he does not mow her lawn. In the case of
Scenario (4), it is B's goal of obtaining $5 that is being negotiated. In this
case, I'll give you $5 if you mow the lawn does not mean that the speaker
will not give addressee $5 if he does not mow her lawn.
These examples illustrate two incontestable facts:
" The goal of utterance interpretation is not simply to recover the conven-
tional meaning of the sentence uttered, but rather, to recognize its
contextual significance or import in the context in which it occurs.
" The contextual significance or import of an utterance does not enjoy a
transparent relationship to the conventional meaning of the sentence
uttered, for a sentence with a single conventional meaning can have a
different significance or import in different contexts.
10. Michael L. Geis & Arnold M. Zwicky, On Invited Inferences, 2 LINGuisTIc INQUIRY 561
(1971),
II. For a definition of the notion "entailment," see example (6), infra.
12. Conversation with Dr. Kate Welker (Summer 1994).
1995] 1127
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These facts have an important bearing on the work of the Court for the
goal of the interpretation of legal texts is to determine what they require 3
or how they are to be applied14 rather than simply what the language that
comprises them conventionally means. No less than in the case of ordinary
conversation, the import of a legal text will typically not enjoy a transpar-
ent relationship to the conventional meaning of the text. Given the
importance of the distinction between the conventional meaning of a text
and its import, some attention must be paid to how it is drawn. We shall
try to draw this distinction quite sharply and then employ the distinction in
an examination of a case in which linguistic analysis played a decisive role.
A. Conventional Meaning and Entailment
At the heart of the interpretation of any sign, whether the sign is
linguistic or drawn from some other system of communication, is the
conventional meaning that is attached to it. This is true of the use of
semaphore flags in ship-to-ship communication and the hand signals used
by combat soldiers in circumstances in which silence must be maintained.
The same is true of the words, phrases, and sentences that comprise a
language. In each of these cases, the conventional meaning of the sign is
arbitrary in that there is no necessary connection between the look or sound
of the sign and its meaning, is widely shared (among the set of persons
who use the communication system), and is attached to the sign itself. In
contrast, the contextual significance or import of any sentence occurring in
a given context will usually not be arbitrary. Rather, it will be rationally
related to the context, 5 the conventional meaning of the sentence
produced, and the assumptions made regarding the possible goal(s) of the
author of the sentence. Therefore, the contextual significance of a sentence
13. Justice White noted in Furman that "Judicial review, by definition, often involves a conflict
between judicial and legislative judgment as to what the Constitution means or requires." 408 U.S. 238,
313. This statement strongly suggests that the Justice saw determination of the significance or import
of the Constitution as being the goal of interpretation.
14. As Chief Justice Burger noted in Furman, "Our constitutional inquiry, however, must be
divorced from personal feelings as to the morality and efficacy of the death penalty, and be confined
to the meaning and applicability of the uncertain language of the Eighth Amendment." 408 U.S. at 375.
Justice Burger is clearly distinguishing what we are calling "conventional meaning" and "contextual
significance."
15. Contexts are best viewed as sets of propositions which the parties to an interaction believe to
be true, for context cannot affect utterance interpretation except insofar as it affects participant beliefs.
When these beliefs are shared by the parties, communication will normally proceed successfully. when
they are not, difficulties in understanding will sometimes arise.
[VOL. 73:1125
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cannot be assumed to be attached to the sentence per se.
Within the fields of linguistics and the philosophy of language, the most
widely accepted theory of conventional linguistic meaning is the truth-
conditional theory. According to this theory, to understand a sentence is to
understand in what circumstances it would be true and in what circumstanc-
es it would be false. Therefore, an account of the meaning of any sentence
should consist of a statement of its truth-conditions, i.e., a statement of the
conditions in which it would be true and the conditions in which it would
be false. 6 In (5), we find an example of an informally stated truth-
condition:
(5) John died is true if and only if John was alive at time tj and was not
alive at time t2, and t, occurred before t2, and t2 was earlier than now.
The classical approach to truth-conditional semantics took the position that
sentences can be given determinate truth-conditions. More recently, it has
been argued that truth-conditions are so dependent on context that it makes
more sense to speak of the truth-conditional potential of sentences, rather
than of its truth-conditions. Two classes of data force this view. First are
deictic forms, forms that refer to elements of the immediate speech context.
This class includes the pronouns I and you and the adverbs here and now,
among others. The second class includes forms which are discourse
dependent such as anaphoric uses of definite pronouns such as she, her, he,
him, and they and them 7 and some uses of the definite article the. 8
The truth-conditional approach to meaning gives rise to a straight-
forward definition of the notion "entailment," thereby facilitating distin-
ctions between those inferences of a text that are logically valid, from those
16. Obviously because imperatives, e.g., Leave the room, and interrogative sentences, e.g., Did he
leave the room?, can be neither true nor false, some modification of this canon must be made for these
cases. We might say that an imperative counts as a directive (command, request, suggestion, etc.) to
the addressee to act in such a way as to make the sentence, You do A, true where "A" is the directive
(e.g., leaving the room). And, we might say that a "Yes-No"-Question, with propositional content, "P"
counts as a directive to the addressee to tell the speaker whether "P" is true or false.
17. Anaphoric pronouns are those that refer to entities that have already been referred to in the
discourse, either in the same sentence or a prior sentence, as is true of him in the following
conversation.
A: Did you see John?
B: No, I didn't see him.
18. Clearly, the truth of If the statute is passed, it will be declared unconstitutional almost
immediately cannot be determined without knowing what the statute refers to, from which it follows
that the truth-condition(s) for the cannot be stated independent of context.
1995] 1129
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that are not including, in particular, Grice's conversational implicatures,"9
a distinction that is obviously critical to the work of the Court.
(6) A proposition P entails a proposition Q if and only if Q is true in
every possible circumstance in which P is true.
The thesis that some proposition P entails another proposition Q can be
falsified by showing that Q is false in a circumstance in which P is true.
Thus, one can falsify any claim to the effect that (2a) entails (2b) by
pointing out that (2a) is true, but (2b) false, in conversation (4) (i.e., there
is at least one circumstance in which P (= (2a)) of definition (6) is true and
Q (= (2b)) is false.)
B. Meaning as 'contextual significance'
Making a sharp distinction between conventional sentence meaning and
the significance the sentence has when produced in a particular context is
clearly important to the work of the Court. Indeed, it is important that we
all understand when a particular interpretation of a legal provision follows
directly from the language involved (i.e., is an entailment of that language)
or is based on assumptions about the context in which the legal text was
authored (e.g., what counted as a cruel and unusual punishment at the time
the Constitution was adopted?), assumptions about the intentions (goals) of
the authors of the text, and canons of interpretation. Unfortunately, the
Court seems too little to appreciate how rarely the language comprising
disputed legal texts (which are the sorts of texts they tend to be asked to
interpret) have a "plain meaning" or a "plain import" or "clear import," all
terms the Court uses. One consequence of this is that the Court sometimes
attributes to the language of a legal text meanings that are at least in part
dependent on contextual information.
19. This term is due to Paul Grice, Logic and Conversation, 3 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS: SPEECH
ACTS 41 (Peter Cole & Jerry Morgan, eds., 1975). A conversational implicature is a nonvalid but
nevertheless contextually compelling inference, normally one that the speaker intends for the addressee
to draw. It is "calculated" from the conventional meaning of the sentence uttered, the context of
utterance, general background knowledge, and the assumption that the speaker is acting in good faith,
Le., is obeying the Cooperative Principle ("Make your conversational contribution such as is required,
at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you
are engaged") and a set of maxims that, should they be followed, ensure cooperativeness. These
maxims, some of which are simplified here, consist of maxims of quantity (Don't say less or more than
is required), quality (Speak the truth and have evidence for what you say), relation ("Be relevant"), and
manner ("Be orderly," "Avoid ambiguity," "Avoid unnecessary prolixity," among others.) Id. at 45-46.
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Reconsider the Can you reach the salt? and I'll give you $5 ifyou mow
the lawn examples. There was a clear relationship between the conventional
meaning of what was said,20 the context of what was said, the perceived
goal of the speaker, and the contextual significance of what was said. We
might formalize the relationship between these elements as in (7), where
"L," is the conventional meaning of the language "L" comprising an
utterance "u," "Cu" is the context in which "u" is uttered, "S" is the
contextual significance of "u," and "G," is the goal of the speaker "s."
Formula (7a) represents a case in which the addressee has a reasonably
good idea as to the possible goals of the speaker and is trying to determine
the contextual significance of what is said. Formula (7b) represents a case
in which the addressee is attempting to identify the goal of the speaker
based on assumptions as to the possible contextual significance of the
utterance.
(7) a. S, = f(L , C,, G,)
b. G, = g(Lu, Cu, So)
Formula (7a) represents the state of affairs in the two "reach the salt" and
the two "lawn mowing" scenarios just discussed, where the goals of the
initiators of the interactions were relatively clear. Formula (7b) represents
the state of affairs that arises when someone says something "out of the
blue" to an addressee. Thus, should A phone his friend, B, early in the
morning on a working day, and say, My car just stalled and I'm up in the
Glen.2 B may hear this as identifying a possible precondition on B's
needing/wanting a ride. As a result, the utterance may implicate that (i.e.,
mean that) A wants B to give him a ride from the Glen to some place,
perhaps his place of work. From that B would reasonably infer that A's
goal is to come to be at this place.
Functions "f' and "g" in (7) represent different modes of informal
reasoning, neither of which is deductive. In the case of "f' we have the
phenomenon of implicature-calculation, the informal mode of reasoning put
forth by Grice based on the Cooperative Principle.22 This is the sort of
reasoning the Court routinely engages in. The canons of interpretation (e.g.,
20. The conventional meaning of a text constrains how it may be interpreted. Had the speaker in
our "reach the salt" examples said, Do you ever use salt?, neither interpretation would likely have
ansen.
21. For discussion of a very interesting ride request that was initiated in just this way, see
MICHAEL L. GELS, SPEECH ACTS AND CONVERSATIONAL INTERACTION 74-84, 109-112 (forthcoming
1995).
22. See GRICE, supra note 19, at 45-46.
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the scienter rule, the rule of lenity, etc.) would be elements of the function
"f." In the case of"g" we have an instance of what the philosopher Charles
Peirce called "abductive reasoning," reasoning from a set of facts (what
we are calling the context) and a novel fact (the speaker's saying
something) to an hypothesis (as to the speaker's goal) that explains the
occurrence of the novel fact.
C. Meaning as 'intention' or 'goal'
In example (ld), we find Justice Marshall citing references by Justices
White and Holmes to the intent of the framers of the Eighth Amend-
ment.24 Unfortunately, the notion of "speaker intention" is itself vague
even if not actually ambiguous. It ranges from what we might call a
person's "motives" in saying or doing something, to the person's "goals,"
where we understand a motive to be a private, possibly inaccessible
intention and a goal to be a publicly accessible intention.
Consider, for instance, a case in which the Senate passes a bill that
prohibits the public display of magazines and newspapers containing figures
of naked persons on their covers. The ostensible goal in this case might be
quite transparent-to keep such items out of the sight of minors. However,
different senators might have different motives for voting for the bill. In the
case of some senators, the motive might be that they wish to reduce the
temptation to minors to purchase such things. In these cases, their motive
closely corresponds to the goal. On the other hand, there might be one or
more senators who vote for the bill in the belief that it is unconstitutional
and that the President will see that this is true and will therefore veto it,
thereby making himself an easy political target, as being "soft on
pornography." In this case, the motives of the voters would be very
different from the ostensible goal of the statute and may not be accessible
to others. Clearly, in the interpretation of the Constitution or of other legal
texts, as well as the interpretation of the language of conversation, the
concern must be with the ostensible, publicly accessible goals of the text,
not the possibly private motives of the author of the text.
II. A CASE STUDY
Let us apply *model (7a) in attempting to understand and evaluate the
23. CHARLES S. PEIRCE, PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF PEIRCE: SELECTED AND EDITED WITH AN
INTRODUCTION BY JUSTUS BUCHLER 151-56 (Justus Buchler ed., 1955).
24. Furman, 408 U.S. 238, 325 (1972).
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linguistic reasoning in Smith v. United States,2" a case in which Justices
O'Connor and Scalia engaged in substantial linguistic argumentation. The
central fact in this case is that the petitioner, Mr. John Angus Smith, made
an offer to an undercover officer, who represented himself as a pawnshop
dealer, to exchange his automatic MAC-10 and silencer for two ounces of
cocaine.26 This was alleged to be a violation of the following provision of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1):
Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime ... uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment
provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced
to imprisonment for five years ....
Specifically, the prosecution claimed that Mr. Smith's bartering his firearm
for drugs constituted using the firearm in a drug trafficking crime. 2' He
was convicted but appealed, arguing that bartering a firearm for drugs does
not constitute use of a firearm within the meaning of the statute.
29
Furthermore, nothing in the trial record indicated that he used the firearm
as a weapon by firing it, threatening anyone with it, or employing it for
self-protection.3" The conviction was upheld on appeal by the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, 3 and the Supreme Court affirmed.32
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, argued:
When a word is not defined by statute, we normally construe it in accord
with its ordinary or natural meaning.. . . Surely petitioner's treatment of his
MAC-10 can be described as "use" within the every day meaning of that
term. Petitioner "used" his MAC-10 in an attempt to obtain drugs by offering
to trade it for cocaine. Webster's defines "to use" as "[t]o convert to one's
service" or "to employ." Black's Law Dictionary contains a similar definition:
"[t]o make use of; to convert to one's service; to employ; to avail oneself of;
to utilize; to carry out a purpose or action by means of." Indeed, over 100
years ago we gave the word "use" the same gloss, indicating that it means "to
employ" or "to derive service from." Petitioner's handling of the MAC-10 in
this case falls squarely within those definitions. By attempting to trade his
MAC-10 for the drugs, he "used" or "employed" it as an item of barter to
25. 113 S. Ct. 2050 (1993).
26. Id. at 2052.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(I) (1988).
28. 113 S. Ct. at 2051. The defendant was not charged with carrying a concealed weapon.
29. Id. at 2053.
30, Id. at 2054.
31. Smith v. United States, 957 F.2d 835 (1lth Cir. 1992).
32, 113 S. CL 2050.
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obtain cocaine; he "derived service" from it because it was going to bring
him the very drugs he sought.33
It is reasonably clear from Justice O'Connor's use of "ordinary or natural
meaning" and "every day meaning" that she has in mind what we are
calling "conventional meaning," as opposed to "contextual significance."
Justice Scalia, in dissent, argued that most people would understand use
a firearm in section 924(c)(1) as meaning 'use a firearm as a weapon.'34
Justice Scalia articulated the principle lying behind this conjecture:
To use an instrumentality ordinarily means to use it for its intended purpose.
When someone asks "Do you use a cane?" he is not inquiring whether you
have your grandfather's silver-handled walking-stick on display in the hall;
he wants to know whether you walk with a cane. Similarly, to speak of
"using a firearm" is to speak of using it for its distinctive purpose, i.e., as a
weapon.. . . To be sure, "one can use a firearm in a number of ways," ante,
at 2055, including as an article of exchange, just as one can "use" a cane as
a hall decoration-but that is not the ordinary meaning of "using" the one or
the other.35
Interestingly, though Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia differ strikingly
in their analysis of use afirearm, they each claim that they are proffering
the "ordinary meaning" of the phrase. However, in order to make sense of
their analyses, we must conclude that Justice O'Connor means 'convention-
al meaning' by her term "ordinary meaning" and Justice Scalia means
'contextual significance.'
Justice O'Connor's argument that the meaning of the phrase36 use a
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime is consistent with
using the firearm as an item of barter is based in part on an examination
of what dictionaries have to say about the meaning of use. One difficulty
with this approach to the determination of conventional meaning is that
dictionary definitions are not definitions at all, but guides to usage, and
quite vague guides at that.37 Secondly, were they construed as definitions
in the sense that this term is used in mathematics and the sciences, they
33. Id. at 2054 (citations omitted).
34. Id. at 2061 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
35. Id.
36. The syntax of this sentence has been rearranged, of course, but not in any way that presents
a problem with the arguments of the text.
37. For an extensive study of how the Court has used and misused linguistic evidence in doing
its work, including, in particular, how it has misused dictionaries, see LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE
LANGUAGE OF JUDGEs (1993).
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would have to be regarded as circular, for if one recursively looks up the
meanings of the words employed in any dictionary "definition" one will
inevitably encounter the word being "defined." The Black's Law Dictionary
definition, for instance, defines to use as '[t]o make use of,'38 which is
quite hopelessly circular. Equating to use with 'to employ' is no better. If
one looks up use in the American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language, one finds that one of the definitions of to use is 'to employ for
some purpose.' 39 But if one looks up the word employ in this dictionary,
one finds that it is defined as 'to use in some process or effort.'40 Thus,
this definition is also circular. The definition '[t]o convert to one's service'
is little better.4' The American Heritage Dictionary provides no definition
of the noun service directly applicable to this case. The closest relevant
"definition" is 'employment in duties or work for another,' 42 where we
find a noun form of employ, which, of course, means 'use,' and we are
back where we began.
We must therefore conclude that Justice O'Conner's claim that the
petitioner "derived service" from the firearm is equivalent to saying that he
"derived use" from it. What we learn from this exercise is that to use
means 'to use' or 'to derive use from,' which provides us little help in
understanding the conventional meaning of use.
Justice O'Connor's analysis would have been better served had she
simply argued that use a firearm as an item of barter during and in
relation to a drug trafficking crime entails use a firearm during and in
relation to a drug trafficking crime, which is the language found in
section 924(c)(1), for this claim is true and makes the point she wished to
make.43 Moreover, against Justice Scalia, she might have responded by
noting that sentence (8a) clearly does not entail (8b).
(8) a. John used the pistol to hammer in the nail.
b. John used the pistol as a weapon in hammering in the nail.
38. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1541 (6th ed. 1990).
39. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1410 (1981).
40. Id. at 428.
41. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2806 (2d ed., 1949),
cited in Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2054 (1993).
42. Id. at 1184.
43. This claim depends on the author's semantic intuition. Fortunately, entailment judgments are
among the most reliable intuitions speakers have and serve as the primary source of data for semantic
analysis, that is, for the analysis of conventional meaning. To back this intuition up, note that Although
John used his firearm to buy drugs, he didn't use his firearm, is self-contradictory. This would not be
true unless "use a firearm to buy drugs" entailed use a firearm.
11351995]
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This falsifies Justice Scalia's claim that "to speak of using a firearm is to
speak of using it for its distinctive purpose, i.e., as a weapon,"' if he
means 'necessarily to speak of' by to speak of.45
The fact that use a firearm as an item of barter during and in relation
to a drug trafficking crime entails use a firearm during and in relation to
a drug trafficking crime does not completely settle the matter of the
conventional meaning of use a firearm during and in relation to a drug
trafficking crime. Observe that the verb use makes room for a parameter
spelling out the nature or purpose of the use.
(9) a. Harry used the pistol to shoot the intruder.
b. Harry used the pistol as a weapon.
(10) a. Harry used his pistol to drive in the nails.
b. Harry used his pistol as a hammer.
(11) a. Harry used his shotgun to prop the door closed.
b. Harry used his shotgun as a door prop.
Not just any verb can occur with such parameters. Note that none of the
following sentences is fully sensible English:
(12) a. *Harry found a rifle as a weapon.
b. *Harry kissed his firearm as a weapon.
C. *Harry threw his firearm away as a weapon.
It is clearly a fact about the conventional meaning of use that it occurs with
a purpose parameter and a fact about the conventional meanings offind,
kiss, and throw away, among many other verbs, that they do not. Thus, we
may conclude that the conventional meaning of use x must be very much
like that of use x as y, where as y may be thought of as a "purpose"
parameter.46
As the examples of (9)-(1 1) demonstrate, use can occur with an explicit
purpose parameter. The question arises as to how we interpret an utterance
in which this parameter is not specified directly. In some cases, the
linguistic or nonlinguistic context will directly determine what this
parameter is. In conversation (13), it would be clear that use your shotgun
would be interpreted as 'use your shotgun as a door prop/to prop closed the
door.'
44. 113 S. Ct. at 2061.
45. If he does not mean this, his claim is empty.
46. This is an oversimplification, for we not only get the phrase use x as y, but also use x to do
a, where "a!' is some action. This simplification does not impact on the argument being made, however.
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(13) a. Harry: I can't find anything to prop the door closed.
b. Sam: Use your shotgun.
How, though do we interpret use x when no purpose parameter is supplied
and none is directly determined by the context?
Although Justice Scalia's claim that "to use an instrumentality ordinarily
means to use it for its intended purpose 4 7 cannot be accepted, it is true
that if someone were to utter a sentence like Harry used his firearm
yesterday completely "out of the blue," the addressee would likely interpret
it as meaning that he fired it. Similarly, virtually anyone told, Harry used
a firearm to rob the bank, would hear that as meaning that Harry
brandished a firearm in robbing the bank or even that he fired a firearm in
robbing the bank. However, in this case, the interpretation of used a
firearm as being equivalent to 'used a firearm as a weapon' is due to the
linguistic context. Specifically, the complement phrase to rob a bank is an
activity in which, if firearms are used, it can be expected that they will be
used as weapons. This analysis is supported by the fact that few, if any,
persons hearing, Harry used a firearm to break into his kid's piggy bank,
would be likely to hear this as meaning 'Harry used a firearm as a weapon
to break into his kid's piggy bank.' In this case, she would be more likely
to hear it as meaning 'Harry used a firearm as a hammer to break into his
kid's piggy bank.' This difference in interpretation is due to the different
effects of the two complements, to rob a bank and to break into his kid's
piggy bank, on how the purpose parameter as y is instantiated.
The linguistic context provided in section 924(c)(1) provides strong
support for the view that use a firearm has the contextual meaning 'use a
firearm as a weapon.'45 Consider first the fact that use a firearm occurs
in the larger construction uses or carries a firearm in section 924(c)(1).
The fact that use occurs contrasted with carry suggests the possibility that
uses or carries a firearm is to be interpreted in something like the way
locutions like killed or injured (Ten people were killed or injured), or own
or lease a car, etc., are interpreted, where the two predicates refer to
actions or states of the same general type, but the first predicate is the
47. 113 S. Ct. at 2061.
48. We are speaking quite informally here. One is not giving a representation of the conventional
meaning of an expression simply in equating it with another expression, as we saw in our analysis of
Justice O'Connor's use of dictionaries. See supra note 36-45 and accompanying text. All we mean to
be doing here is asserting that whatever the correct representation of the conventional meaning of use
x is, it must contain a purpose parameter of the sort found in use x as y.
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stronger predicate.49 Were this interpretation to be correct, it would
support the petitioner's and Justice Scalia's position that use a firearm
contextually means 'use a firearm as a weapon,' where firing or brandish-
ing a weapon is a stronger (i.e., more threatening) action than simply
carrying it.
Second, the language of section 924(c)(1) provides that the sentence to
be imposed on the defendant must vary with the nature of the firearm.
Following the passage cited earlier, section 924(c)(1) goes on to say:
[A]nd if the firearm is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or
semiautomatic assault weapon, to imprisonment for ten years, and if the
firearm is a machinegun, or a destructive device, 0 or is equipped with a
firearm silencer or firearm muffler, to imprisonment for thirty years."
The nature of the sentence to be imposed seems to be a function of the
deadliness of the firearm ("semiautomatic assault weapon" versus "machine
gun") and its efficacy in criminal activities (use of silencers can reduce the
chance of being observed engaging in the crime). This strongly supports the
thesis that, in the statute, use afirearm contextually means 'use a firearm
as a weapon.'52
Justice O'Connor supported her position with two counter-arguments.
Her first counter-argument was:
It is one thing to say that the ordinary meaning of "uses a firearm" includes
using a firearm as a weapon, since that is the intended purpose of a firearm
and the example of "use" that most immediately comes to mind. But it is
quite another to conclude that, as a result, the phrase also excludes any other
use. Certainly that conclusion does not follow from the phrase "uses ... a
firearm" itself. As the dictionary definitions and experience make clear, one
can use a firearm in a number of ways. That one example of "use" is the first
to come to mind when the phrase "uses ... a firearm" is uttered does not
preclude us from recognizing that there are other "uses" that qualify as well.
In this case, it is both reasonable and normal to say that petitioner "used" his
49. The suggestion that killed and own are stronger predicates than injured and lease is based on
the present author's intuition that to be killed or injured is bad and that to be killed is worse than being
injured and that owning and leasing a car are good and owning a car is better in some sense than
leasing one. Just how general this phenomenon is is unclear.
50. This reference to a "destructive device" is clearly linguistically infelicitous if what is meant
is a bomb or hand grenade, for such things are not firearms at all.
51. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1988).
52. The reader is reminded that we are speaking quite informally here. In saying "use x
contextually means 'use x as y"' all we mean to be saying is that the correct representation of the
conventional meaning of use x must contain a purpose parameter of the sort found in use x as y.
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MAC-10 in his drug trafficking offense by trading it for cocaine; the dissent
does not contend otherwise."
A difficulty with Justice O'Connor's counterargument is that she does not
give proper weight to the linguistic context in which use a firearm
occurs. 4 Moreover, she provides no principle which could be used to
exclude arguably spurious applications of her theory. Given the Justice's
line of argument, each of the following actions would be violations of
section 924(c)(1)."
(14) a. Fearing that someone might barge into his apartment while he was
purchasing drugs from his brother, John, Harry went into his closet,
got out his civil-war era rifle, and propped his door closed.
b. While purchasing drugs from his brother, John, Harry found that he
couldn't remember the combination of the lock he used to secure
his money box, so he went to his desk, got out his target pistol, and
hammered the lock open.
In these cases, use of the firearm advances the drug deal forward (i.e.,
Harry employs and derives service from the rifle and pistol). However, in
neither is it used as a weapon (i.e., to shoot or threaten anyone). Nor would
it likely be so used, since the two parties are brothers. Arguably there is no
"ordinary" or "natural" or "every day" or "normal"56 meaning of "use a
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime" according to
which Harry's actions in (14) constitute violations of section 924(c)(1).
A second argument Justice O'Connor advanced against the petitioner and
Justice Scalia is:
In petitioner's view, § 924(c)(1) should require proof not only that the
defendant used the firearm but also that he used it as a weapon. But the
words "as a weapon" appear nowhere in the statute. Rather, § 924(c)(1)'s
language sweeps broadly, punishing any "us[e]" of a firearm, so long as the
53. 113 S. Ct. at 2055.
54. This despite the fact that she clearly recognizes the importance of context, saying at one point,
"The meaning of a word that appears ambiguous if viewed in isolation may become clear when the
word is analyzed in light of the terms that surround it." 113 S. Ct. at 2054.
55. In arguing that the majority's construction of the phrase uses... afirearm will not produce
anomalous applications, Justice O'Connor cites a case of someone who scratches his head during a drug
deal, noting that a use of a firearm would be punishable only if it "facilitates or furthers the drug crime"
and the defendant's scratching his head neither facilitates nor furthers the drug crime. Id. at 2058-2059.
However, the examples cited in the present text involve uses of a firearm for an "innocuous purpose"
but do further the drug crime.
56, These are all predicates that Justice O'Connor employs in her argument at one point or
another.
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use is "during and in relation to" a drug trafficking offense.
This argument suffers from the difficulty that we normally do not make
explicit what we reasonably believe our addressees will assume, including
references to the normal uses of the things words refer to. The normal use
of a firearm, as Justice Scalia noted and Justice O'Connor conceded, is as
a weapon. The authors of section 924(c)(1) can be expected not to have
made explicit that they meant to make illegal the use of a gun as a weapon
in a drug deal because that interpretation would clearly be recognized by
anyone reading the statute (who is a speaker of English and is of sound
mind). Moreover, it would have been very difficult, simply as a stylistic
matter, to have added the phrase "as a weapon" to section 924(c)(1). 8
The Justice's argument can lead to unwanted results. Suppose that the
Ohio legislature decided to make it illegal "to use a computer in the
commission of a crime," and someone was found to have beaten someone
else over the head with his laptop computer. To claim not only that our
lawbreaker had committed assault, but had broken the law against using a
computer in the commission of a crime would be absurd. Using Justice
O'Connor's reasoning, however, we would be entitled to say that since the
law did not say that the computer had to be used in computing something
as a part of the criminal act the language of the law "sweeps broadly" and
therefore includes its use as a weapon.
In fact, the failure of Congress to include a purpose parameter in section
924(c)(1) provides a powerful argument that they envisioned a "normal
use" interpretation. Suppose, in this light, that Harry tells his employee Sam
to use a new claw hammer Harry has just purchased to put in a floor, and
that Sam not only uses the hammer to drive in nails, but also to pry up a
board that he had nailed in incorrectly. Suppose, finally, that the head of
the hammer breaks in the course of prying up the board. Harry is unlikely
to accept Sam's defense that he was entitled to use the claw hammer to pry
up a board because when Harry said, Use this hammer to put in the floor,
he didn't say, Use this hammer (only) to drive in nails in putting in the
57. Id. at 2054.
58. Neither whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime...
uses as a weapon or carries a firearm .... nor Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime ... uses or carries a firearm as a weapon, ... is stylistically
felicitous. The first is stylistically barbarous; the second suggests that carry might be a verb, like use,
that takes a purpose parameter, which is doubtful. Had Congress intended for its language to "sweep
broadly" it could have said, whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking
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floor. The point is that we-and this includes Congress--depend on others
to interpret what we write and say in standard ways unless there is a
compelling reason not to do so. Because of this, we feel free not to spell
out precisely what we mean in cases in which a standard interpretation is
intended.
We have here two starkly opposed positions: that the phrase use a
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime applies to a use
of a firearm as an item of barter and that it does not. Both positions claim
to reflect the "ordinary meaning" of this phrase. Arguably, this conflict has
arisen because Justice O'Connor is concerned with the conventional
meaning of the phrase and Justice Scalia with its contextual meaning.
Certainly Justice O'Connor gives a highly decontextualized treatment of use
a firearm.
The difficulty with Justice O'Connor's analysis of the conventional
meaning of use a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime
is that it is functionally equivalent to bring a firearm to the scene of a drug
trafficking crime or handle a firearm at the scene of a drug trafficking
crime. However, had Congress intended so broad an interpretation it could
have said, "whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or
drug trafficking crime. . ., uses a firearm in any way, shall, in addition to
the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years... ." However, it must
be recognized that the fact that Congress did not adopt such language is
consistent either with the thesis that it simply did not occur to Congress
that it should do so in order to achieve its goals or that it did not intend its
language to "sweep broadly."
The problem with Justice O'Connor's position is not that her analysis of
the conventional meaning of "to use a firearm during and in relation to a
drug trafficking crime," is wrong, but that it is incomplete. Recall our
formula (7a), which is repeated below as (15).
(15) S. = f(L,, C., G )
We may see Justice O'Connor's claim as a claim about "Lu" (a largely
decontextualized interpretation) and Justice Scalia's claim as a claim about
the significance "S," of use afirearm in the context in which it occurs, i.e.,
as equivalent to "f(Lu, C.)." According to this analysis, the Justices are
talking about two very different senses of meaning.
Were we forced to choose between the positions of Justices O'Connor
and Scalia on purely linguistic grounds, we would have to side with Justice
Scalia. However, the interpretation of section 924(c)(1) is arguably incom-
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plete, for the issue cannot be what the phrase use a firearm during and in
relation to a drug trafficking crime means, but what the statute means. To
determine this we must consider the intent of Congress ("G" in formula
(15)) as well as the application of canons of reasoning or other interpretive
principles. This could possibly include those advanced by Grice.59
In presenting the majority decision in Smith, Justice O'Connor quoted the
District of Columbia Circuit Court's observation that
It may well be that Congress, when it drafted the language of [§] 924(c), had
in mind a more obvious use of guns in connection with a drug crime, but the
language [of the statute] is not so limited[;] nor can we imagine any reason
why Congress would not have wished its language to cover this situation.
Whether guns are used as the medium of exchange for drugs sold illegally or
as a means to protect the transaction or dealers, their introduction into the
scene of drug transactions dramatically heightens the danger to society.6"
If the intent of Congress was, in fact, to minimize "the danger to society"
that the firing of weapons during drug transactions poses, then one could
argue that it is the presence of firearms at the scene of drug crimes which
could be used as weapons that Congress was trying to discourage in
framing section 924(c)(1). 6 Because a loaded MAC-10 which is brought
to the scene of a drug deal as an item of barter could be used as a weapon
should the drug crime go sour, such a use of the MAC-10 would count as
a violation of section 924(c)(1). The question arises as to whether this is an
interpretation of section 924(c)(1) that its language will bear.
The reasoning of the Court comes down to the claim that Congress
meant (16b) by (16a), that is, that (16b) follows rationally from the
conventional meaning of (16a), the linguistic context, and the assumption
that Congress was attempting to discourage the presence of firearms in
violent crimes and drug trafficking crimes in passing 924(c)(1).
(16) a. Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime. . . , uses or carries a firearm ....
b. Whoever introduces a firearm into the scene of a drug transaction,
The problem here is that the significance of (16a), in the linguistic context
59. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
60. 113 S. Ct. at 2059 (quoting United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246, 261 (per curiam), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 362 (1992)).
61. Ironically, this theory of the ultimate significance or import of section 924(c)(I) depends on
an assumption that use afirearm means 'use a firearm as a weapon.'
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in which it occurs, is something on the order of (17).
(17) Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime .... carries a firearm ....
The difficulty is that (18), which is the provision of 924(c)(1) that the
petitioner was charged with violating, is vastly stronger than (16b), when
interpreted in the linguistic context in which it occurs.
(18) Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime .... uses a firearm, ....
To argue that (18) implicates (1 6b) comes down to claiming that consider-
ation of the intent of a speaker in interpreting language can have the effect
of substantially weakening the force of that language, and this is not the
effect that consideration of speaker intent normally has. Thus, while the
petitioner may have violated 924(c)(1), he appears not to have violated the
part of the law that he was charged with violating.
The problem with the Court's reasoning is that, in arguing that (18)
implicates (16b), the Court does serious violence to the most credible
interpretation of the meaning use afirearm has in the linguistic context in
which it occurs, which is 'use a firearm as a weapon.' The point is that the
language of any statute must limit the interpretation the Court gives to the
statute. This means not that the conventional meaning of this language must
restrict the Court's interpretation, but that the contextual significance of this
language must do so for the meaning the language has in the context in
which it occurs is the only meaning it has. Thus, in the canon of interpreta-
tion according to which the Court should not give a legal text a meaning
it cannot bear, the operative sense of "meaning" must be contextual
meaning (contextual significance), not conventional meaning. Adoption of
this thesis will tend to encourage overbroad construals of statutes which
violate the rule of lenity.62
III. CONCLUSION
We began with the observation that the Court uses the words mean and
62. Justice Scalia took the position in Smith that use afirearm was ambiguous and that the rule
of lenity should lead the Court to take the interpretation-the 'use a firearm as a weapon' interpreta-
tion-that favors the petitioner. 113 S. Ct. at 2063. In fact, use afirearm is not ambiguous insofar as
either its conventional meaning or contextual meaning is concerned. One may revise the Justice's
application of the rule of lenity by saying that the Court should give the instantiation to the purpose
parameter that favors the petitioner when alternate instantiations are theoretically possible.
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meaning in a number of ways. The difficulty with this is that there are two
senses of these words that cd'n, and often are confused, and these are what
we have been calling "conventional meaning" and "contextual signifi-
cance." Locutions containing mean that are particularly problematic, for
mean that is sometimes equivalent to 'entail' and sometimes to 'implicate.'
Clearly it is in the interest of the Court to be more explicit about what it
means by mean and meaning. Unfortunately, its practice of adding
modifiers like common, ordinary, natural, every day, and plain not only
does not make its meaning clearer, it further exacerbates the problem.
The Supreme Court would be well-advised to adopt the analytic
techniques of linguists, specifically semanticians and pragmaticians. Rather
than the question-begging usage of dictionaries, the Court could employ
entailment tests of the sort used here to determine the conventional
meaning of the language of disputed texts. Arguably, it would come up
with results that not only are more empirically sound, but provide a
stronger basis for its real task-to determine the applicability or import,
i.e., the contextual significance, of the legal texts that the Court interprets.
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